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1 International criminal law: nature, origins and a few
key issues
Bartram S. Brown

The purpose of international criminal law is to establish the criminal responsibility of individuals for international crimes. Public international law is traditionally focused on the rights
and obligations of states, and thus is not particularly well suited to this task. It has adapted
through a long and slow historical process, drawing upon multiple sources. Many of the chapters in this Handbook explore to some extent the historical development of international criminal law. I will not attempt to summarize that history in detail, but a few historical
observations here will help to explain how international criminal law emerged from its
sources in public international law, comparative law, international humanitarian law and
international human rights law. This will set the stage for an introductory discussion of some
key issues in contemporary international criminal law.

ORIGINS AND SOURCES
Public International Law
International criminal law has developed and grown as part of a broader system of public
international law which, since 1648, has been based on state sovereignty, including each
state’s jurisdiction over its own territory and citizens. A basic system of international law,
defining the rights and obligations of states, was needed to recognize and validate this sovereignty, but this decentralized system has no legislature. Instead, international law must be
based on the consent of states, arising from one or more of three formal sources: i.e. treaties,
customary international law, or general principles of law. Treaties make binding law for those
states that agree to accept them. Rules of customary international law develop when the
actions of states, their general and consistent practices, demonstrate their implied consent to
those rules. General principles of law, especially when common to the laws of many nations,
can also be applied at the international level. Judicial decisions and scholarly writings are
recognized as secondary sources of international law, and are especially useful as indicators
of changes in customary international law. International crimes, and the other substantive
aspects of international criminal law, emerge from these same sources.
Public international law is predominantly state-centric both in the sense that it is based on
the consent of states and also because its central focus has always been the rights and obligations of states. According to the well-established and recently codified law of state responsibility,1 any state’s violation of its international legal obligations entails legal consequences.
1

For the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and the ILC

3
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But the law of state responsibility says nothing about the legal responsibility of individual
persons for international crimes,2 therefore the progress of international criminal law has
required the development of a whole new field of public international law. International criminal law is largely unconcerned with state responsibility, focusing instead on the criminal
responsibility of those individuals who commit international crimes.3
It is impossible to introduce the development of individual criminal responsibility in international law without referring, at least briefly, to the unique 1474 precedent of Peter von
Hagenbach, Governor of Breisach, in southern Germany. In that year he was charged with
‘trampling under foot the laws of God and man’ for acts including murder, rape, and ‘orders
to his non-German mercenaries to kill the men in the houses where they were quartered so
that the women and children would be completely at their mercy’. 4 He was tried by an international panel of 28 judges, and after his conviction for multiple crimes, stripped of his
knighthood and executed. This singular historical example nonetheless illustrates that an
international criminal trial for atrocities was viewed as an appropriate option well prior to the
formal birth of the nation-state system circa 1648. It would be centuries before the states at
the center of that new system would once again resort to an international criminal trial.
Traditionally, international law has defined very few crimes, proscribing only acts generally viewed as a serious threat to the interests of the international community as a whole. For
centuries, piracy has been recognized as an international crime under customary international
law. Slave trading joined the list at the end of the nineteenth century when that practice was
outlawed by treaty.
Comparative Law
Criminal law developed first at the national level. Its principles emerged from philosophy and
government, grew through practice and experience and were spread by forces ranging from
violent revolution to their peaceable incorporation into constitutions and legislation. The US
Constitution’s Bill of Rights and France’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen are examples of this. Each reflects philosophical notions of justice which were
Commentary to the Articles, see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fiftythird Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in James
Crawford, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION,
TEXT AND COMMENTARIES (2002) (hereinafter ‘ILC Articles on State Responsibility’).
2
With regard to individual criminal responsibility, the International Law Commission (ILC) has
merely observed as follows: ‘The term “individual responsibility” has acquired an accepted meaning in
light of the Rome Statute and other instruments; it refers to the responsibility of individual persons,
including State officials, under certain rules of international law for conduct such as genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity.’ ILC Commentary on the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (hereinafter ‘ILC Commentary’)
Commentary on Article 58, para. 3.
3
In the course of its attempts to codify the law of state responsibility the International Law
Commission (ILC) did explore the possibility of defining state crimes under international law. The
attempt was controversial and was omitted from the final version of the Articles on State Responsibility
adopted by the ILC. This matter is briefly discussed in notes 38 and 39 infra and the associated text.
4
For more on this case and for a good discussion of the development of individual criminal
responsibility under international law, see Edoardo Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal
Responsibility under International Law, 835 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531 (1999), available at
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JQ2X.
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invoked to justify political and social revolution before being enshrined in a new constitutional framework of laws, notably including criminal law. From their national origins, basic
principles of criminal law have percolated up into the international legal arena via their incorporation into treaties and their acceptance, based on state practice, as general principles of law
or even as part of customary international law.
Inevitably, international criminal law has borrowed from the rules, principles and ideas to
be found within the domestic legal systems of states, adapting the best of these as the basis
of individual criminal responsibility under international law. This method of borrowing from
another legal system is the essence of comparative law.5 The Statute of the International
Court of Justice identifies ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ as a
formal source of international law.6 Thus, comparative law is a source of international law at
least insofar as it facilitates the identification of legal principles common to national legal
systems.7 It is important to keep in mind that, beyond this formal source, an ultimate material source of the general principles of law lies in philosophical notions of right and justice.
National systems of criminal justice can be divided into at least two very different models,
that is the Anglo-American common law model or the civil law model familiar on the continent of Europe. National criminal law can vary widely even among states both following the
same one of these two models. The fact is that national legal systems of criminal law do not
necessarily share the same general principles, and this complicates the task of building a
system of international criminal law which is truly international.
Two overarching principles of criminal law, both deeply rooted in comparative law and
philosophy, are the principle of culpability and the principle of legality.8 These principles
underlie most of the general principles of criminal law codified into the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC), but even they are not universally recognized as general
principles of national, or international, criminal law.
Principle of legality
The principle of legality, considered to be fundamental to the rule of law on the European

5
‘The utility of comparative law … The only serious answer, it seems to me, is that the utility
is the improvement which is made possible in one legal system as a result of knowledge of the rules and
structures in another system. This improvement may occur in various sways … What these ways all
have in common is that they concern borrowing. Comparative law as a practical study is therefore about
legal transplants, the desirability and practicality of borrowing from another legal system.’ Alan
Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE LJ 313, 317–18 (1978).
6
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, art. 38(1)(b), (c), 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187.
7
‘The basic notion is that a general principle of international law is some proposition of law so
fundamental that it will be found in virtually every legal system. When treaties and customary international law fail to offer a needed international rule, a search may be launched in comparative law to
discover if national legal systems use a common legal principle. If such a common legal principle is
found, then it is presumed that a comparable principle should be attributed to fill the gap in international
law.’ MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (4th edn, Aspen Publishers, 2003).
8
See Nils Jareborg, Criminal Reponsibility: Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2
OHIO ST. J CRIM. L 521, 522 (2005): ‘The principle of legality (nulla poena sine lege) and the principle
of culpability (nulla poena sine culpa) are often mentioned as the basic pillars of modern criminal law,
but usually only the first of these is given any legally binding status in relation to the legislator.’
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continent,9 is rarely referred to as such in the United States.10 Nonetheless, the underlying
concept is as well known in that country as it is in Western Europe. A rare US district court
decision that does directly refer to the principle of legality observes that it ‘has historically
found expression in the [US] criminal law rule of strict construction of criminal statutes, and
in the [US] constitutional principles forbidding ex post facto operation of the criminal law,
[and] vague criminal statutes’. 11
The ICC Statute does not refer to the principle of legality by name, but that principle is
reflected in both article 22 of the ICC Statute, nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without
law), and in article 23, nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without law). These are two different expressions of the principle of legality.
Principle of culpability
The principle of culpability expresses a moral theory of responsibility and punishment which
essentially holds that ‘[t]he equation of criminal responsibility with moral blameworthiness
is the primary justification for imposing criminal sanctions’.12 This notion is broadly, but not
universally,13 accepted as the basis of criminal law. In many countries the principle of culpability is seen as a fundamental precept of criminal law, requiring that moral culpability be the
basis for the imposition of individual criminal liability and that the severity of any sentence
imposed be likewise based on the moral culpability of the actor concerned.14

9
Stanislaw Pomorski notes that the principle of legality, ‘nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege
is considered as fundamental to the rule of law by all penal systems of continental Europe. It is
commonly understood as including at least four requirements: 1) making statutory law the exclusive
source of criminalization; 2) prohibition of criminalization by analogy; 3) prohibition of ex post facto
laws; and 4) a requirement of definiteness of criminal statutes.’ Stanislaw Pomorski, Review Essay:
Reflections on the First Criminal Code of Post-Communist Russia, 46 AM. J COMP. L 375, 384 (citing
a work by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck in Polish).
10
See Jordan J. Paust, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in
International Law: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems Confronting International Law and
Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: It’s No Defense: Nullum Crimen, International
Crime and the Gingerbread Man, 60 ALB. L REV. 657, 669 (1997) (noting that US court cases have
hardly ever referred to nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege or to the principle of legality).
11
United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 316–17 (E.D. La. 1981).
12
See John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J CRIM.
L 1, 21 (1997): ‘The equation of criminal responsibility with moral blameworthiness is the primary
justification for imposing criminal sanctions’, citing H.L.A. Hart’s statement that ‘it is necessary to be
able to say on good conscience in each instance in which a criminal sanction is imposed for a violation
of law that the violation was blameworthy and, hence, deserving of the moral condemnation of the
community’. Henry M. Hart, Jr, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 401, 412
(1958).
13
See John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 AM.
CRIM. L REV. 111, 112 (1996), ‘criminal law is not explained by moral individual culpability’.
14
See Pomorski, note 9 supra, at 385. (‘The principle of culpability is recognized in European
democracies as a fundamental precept of criminal law. Since criminal sanction expresses social
condemnation, it must be personally deserved by an actor. Consequently, not only must the ascription
of responsibility be contingent upon a finding of personal culpability, but the severity of punishment
must not exceed the limits of actor’s culpability. Preventive goals of criminal punishment may be
pursued only within the limits marked by culpability of an actor. This way the culpability principle
works as a restraint on the government, as a safeguard against inflicting punishment on undeserving
individuals for some purely pragmatic reasons.’)
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The ICC Statute does not mention the principle of culpability by name, much less identify
it as a general principle of criminal law. Nonetheless, the principle is reflected in many articles of the Statute, perhaps most clearly in article 30 on the mental element, or mens rea. This
article restricts criminal responsibility before the ICC to those who have intentionally
committed the material elements of a crime, with knowledge or awareness of the likely consequences.15 These, of course, are basic elements of culpability.
International Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian law originated in the nineteenth century, a time when a ‘statecentric’16 concept of international law prevailed. The law of nations17 of that era was generally believed to define rights and duties for states but not for individuals, and so the law of
armed conflict, as it first emerged, did not formally recognize the rights of individuals or
directly provide for individual criminal responsibility for any violations.
An international humanitarian law defining and regulating individual criminal responsibility differs substantially from one which merely defines the legal obligations of states inter
se. In order to develop, international criminal law has often needed to bridge this conceptual
gap through a functional adaptation of the norms of international humanitarian law.
In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln signed the Lieber Code, the first real codification of
the customary laws of war. It set out a broad range of rules formulated as Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.18 Among other things, the Lieber
Code called for the humane and ethical treatment of populations in occupied areas, forbade
the use of poisons and the use of torture, described the rights and duties of prisoners of war,
and distinguished between the permissible and impermissible means to attain the ends of
warfare. The substance of the Lieber Code was incorporated into treaty in the 1907 Hague
15
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, UN Doc.
A/CONF 183/9*, 37 ILM 1002 (1998), corrected up to 16 January 2002, available at www.icc-cpi.int/.
ICC Statute, art. 30, on the mental element provides: ‘1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if
the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge. 2. For the purposes of this article, a
person has intent where: (a) in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) in
relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in
the ordinary course of events.’
16
See Bartram S. Brown, The Protection of Human Rights in Disintegrating States: A New
Challenge, 68 CHICAGO-KENT L REV. 203, 204 (1992) (discussing the ‘state-centric’ nature of international law).
17
Mark Janis argues that ‘the law of nations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries [was] a
law common to individuals as well as to states’ which developed into an international law of narrower
scope in the era of nineteenth-century positivism. Janis notes that in 1789, when Jeremy Bentham
invented the expression ‘international law’ in his INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION, he offered the term as a replacement for the older term ‘law of nations’ and that Bentham
incorrectly assumed that, under either name, the scope of that law was limited to the relations between
states. This contributed to the narrow scope of international law which prevailed in the nineteenth
century. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 228–34 (2nd edn, 1993).
18
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code of
1863), prepared by Francis Lieber, Correspondence, Orders, Reports and Returns of the Union
Authorities from January 1 to December 31, 1863 #7, OR Series III, vol. III [S# 124], General Orders
No. 100.
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Regulations, which still did not address the issue of individual criminal responsibility under
international law.
The essential purpose of international humanitarian law is to protect individuals in time of
war.19 To do so effectively, it should be applied as international criminal law to the broadest
possible range of international and internal armed conflicts. Thus, as notions of natural and
inalienable rights unfolded in the nineteenth century, subjecting even the conduct of devastating wars to civilizing rules of humanity, it was inevitable that there would eventually have
to be a criminal law aspect. International law is still largely state-centric, but since individuals commit international crimes, international criminal responsibility is essential if these
crimes are to be addressed effectively. Without it the system of international law would on its
face seem to be incomplete. The 1474 prosecution of Peter von Hagenbach presaged this
truth.
International Human Rights Law
International human rights law is a relatively new part of international law, and its focus upon
individual rights makes it less state-centric than general international law. The idea of universal human rights has its origins in concepts of natural rights and the inherent dignity of the
human being, but the international law of human rights has developed well beyond its philosophical origins.
The horrors of the Nazi holocaust brought home to many the need for an international law
of human rights. When concerned people and governments abroad protested the treatment of
Jews and other oppressed groups in Germany, apologists for the Nazi regime could reject
these protestations by characterizing the issue as a matter within the domestic jurisdiction and
national sovereignty of the German state. Although the genocidal ‘Final Solution’ was
morally abhorrent and unmistakably wrong, its illegality under positive international law was
less clear. The inadequacy of the existing positive international law became apparent, and this
provided the impetus for changes to come.
Since the Second World War there has been a major thrust toward the enactment of a positive international law of human rights. By articulating human rights norms in treaties and
other international normative instruments, states and international organizations have done
more than simply create a few more rules of positive international law. They have begun to
transform the nature of the international system.
The United Nations Charter represented a major advance in the codification of the international political order, and it did much to develop the international legal order as well.
Promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all is
explicitly mentioned as one of that organization’s purposes,20 and thus human rights were for
the first time definitively declared to be a matter of international concern. On the other hand,
the Charter is not very specific about the human rights and freedoms to be promoted, or about
any specific obligations of states relating to human rights.

19
‘It is the object of international humanitarian law to regulate hostilities in order to attenuate
their hardships. Humanitarian law is that considerable portion of international law which is inspired by
a feeling for humanity and is centered on the protection of the individual in time of war.’ JEAN PICTET,
DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (1985).
20
See the Preamble to the UN Charter, and art. 1(3).
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Another problem is that the Charter also expresses principles which can be invoked against
international action to protect human rights. It reaffirms the ‘sovereign equality’ of UN
member states,21 and the United Nations’s lack of authority to intervene in the domestic jurisdiction of its members.22 The latter two provisions serve to reinforce the argument that state
sovereignty should preclude any intrusive international action for the protection of human
rights.
Some of these deficiencies were remedied when the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights23 was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, and the post-Charter evolution
of international human rights norms and procedures began. The Universal Declaration
proclaims itself ‘as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’24 in
the field of human rights, and it is, in fact, the most frequently cited standard of international
human rights. But as a resolution of the UN General Assembly, it is formally non-binding,
and this raises the question of its effect upon the development of international human rights
law.
Georges Abi-Saab has noted that the normative effect of UN General Assembly resolutions depends upon three factors, i.e. the degree of consensus behind the resolution, the
degree of concreteness of the normative language in the resolution, and the extent to which
mechanisms of implementation have been provided for.25 The Universal Declaration was
adopted by the General Assembly with no negative votes (although there were eight abstentions); thus, the consensus behind that resolution was very strong. Today, more than 60 years
after the adoption of the Declaration, the international consensus on the international human
rights standards it sets out remains strong. As far as concreteness is concerned, the Universal
Declaration represents a vast improvement over the general human rights language found in
the UN Charter.
A large number of international human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,26 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,27 and the Convention Against Torture,28 have expanded and clarified the scope of
international human rights law. Unfortunately, this progress in the normative development of

21
UN Charter, art. 2, para. 1, states that ‘The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign
equality of all its Members.’
22
UN Charter, art. 2, para. 7 states that ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state, or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.’
23
General Assembly Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948, UN Doc. A/810/71 (1948).
24
Ibid. Preamble.
25
See Georges Abi-Saab, Introduction, in LES RESOLUTIONS DANS LA FORMATION DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DU DÉVELOPMENT, Etudes et Travaux de l’IUHEI No. 13 9–10. Geneva, Institut
Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1971).
26
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), General Assembly Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, entered into force
23 March 1976.
27
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Assembly Res.
2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, entered into
force 3 January 1976.
28
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, General Assembly Res. 39/46, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) 197, UN Doc. A/39/51
(1984), entered into force 26 June 1987.
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human rights has not been matched by the development of truly effective mechanisms of
implementation.
International human rights law is relevant to international criminal law in a number of
ways. First and foremost, international human rights law defines international fair-trial standards29 that apply throughout international criminal law and which have been incorporated
into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.30 These rules reflect a broad international consensus on the principles of legality and culpability referred to in the discussion
of comparative law above. As a matter of substantive criminal law, the Convention Against
Torture (CAT) requires states parties to make torture a crime under their domestic law31 and
to prosecute or extradite those suspected of committing acts of torture as defined in that
treaty.32 For the most part, the basic rules of the CAT have been accepted by states as part of
customary international law, and therefore bind all states. Similar rules apply to the crime of
genocide, which is also defined by treaty.33

A FEW KEY THEMES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
Development of General Principles of International Criminal Law
The identification and clarification of the general principles of international criminal law is
an important goal,34 but making progress towards that goal has not been easy. While it is clear
that general principles of law recognized by civilized nations may be a source of international
law, it is far less clear what general principles of criminal law have been recognized by the
major legal systems of the world. Identifying them is an exercise in comparative law. The task
is complicated by the fact that general principles of criminal law have developed in national
systems which vary a great deal. In addition to the differences between the two best-known
models, i.e. common law and civil law, there are also legal systems reflecting Islamic law and
many other variations. International criminal law has had very little time to develop independently of that diverse array of national legal systems, as most of that development has
come during the past 20 years. In general, there is a lack of clarity and consensus about the
relationship between general principles of law, general principles of international law,
general principles of criminal law, and general principles of international criminal law.

29

See ICCPR, art. 14, for the most generally accepted codification of international fair trial

rights.
30
31

See David Weisssbrodt and Kristin K. Zinsmaste, Chapter 11.
‘Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.’
Convention Against Torture, art. 4(1).
32
Ibid. art. 5.
33
See Mark Drumbl, Chapter 3.
34
See Kai Ambos, Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law, 4 J INT’L CRIM.
JUSTICE 660 (2006), calling for more focus upon the identification and application of the general principles of international criminal law, in order to ensure consistency with fundamental principles of criminal law including the principles of legality and culpability.
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General principles of law recognized by civilized nations are, as noted above,35 a source of
international law, whereas general principles of international law are, at least arguably, ‘the
principles inherent in the international legal system’.36 What Cassese refers to as ‘general
principles of criminal law recognized by the community of nations’37 is presumably a subset
of the general principles of law mentioned above which can be identified by comparative
analysis, but it seems clear that there is as yet no consensus on a complete set of such principles. The general principles of international criminal law will therefore need to be built and
agreed upon over time. The ‘general principles of criminal law’ set out in the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court were the subject of diplomatic negotiations and will
provide the basis for further development of relevant general principles in the future.
State Responsibility Versus Individual Criminal Responsibility: The State or Entity
Behind International Crimes
As noted above, the focus of international criminal law is establishing the criminal responsibility of individuals for their violations of international law which constitute international
crimes. Since international crimes are committed by and attributed to individuals and not
states, international criminal law is not a matter of state responsibility. In the course of its
decades-long effort to codify the international law of state responsibility, the International
Law Commission considered the notion that states themselves could face penal, as well as
delictual, responsibility for certain especially serious violations of international law. 38 The
concept of so-called ‘crimes of state’ was ultimately so sensitive and controversial that no
consensus could be achieved on the subject.39 But the International Law Commission’s decision to exclude language about state crimes from the final version of its articles on state
responsibility did not resolve the underlying tensions.
The fact is that governments may feel threatened by the criminal prosecutions of their officials or other nationals even if this does not entail a formal determination of state responsibility. At the conclusion of the Rome diplomatic conference, the US government was highly
critical of the Rome Statute which had just been adopted. At one point, US officials argued
that if the ICC could try a US national without the consent of the US government, the treaty
would effectively be imposing obligations upon the United States as a non-party state.40

35
See the discussion of general principles of law as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38 note 6 supra and the accompanying text.
36
Cassese states that ‘[g]eneral principles of international law consist of principles inherent in
the international legal system’. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 31 (2003).
37
Ibid. 32.
38
Compare ‘crimes of state’ in the meaning of art. 19 of the International Law Commission’s
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Part 1), adopted by the ILC on first reading. [1976] 2 YB Int’l L
Comm’n, Pt 2, 73, 95–6, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1 (Pt 2).
39
See ILC Commentary, note 2 supra, at 279–81.
40
Compare comments by US Ambassador David Scheffer that ‘I can tell you that it would be
bizarre, utterly bizarre consequence for governments to think that this treaty can be adopted and brought
into force with the presumption that it will cover governments that have not joined the treaty regime.
That is bizarre. That’s weird. That is unheard of in treaty law.’ Davod Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large
For War Crimes Issues, On-the-Record Briefing at the Foreign Press Center, 31 July 1998, available at
www.amicc.org/docs/Scheffer7_31_98.pdf.
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Equating potential ICC jurisdiction over individuals with the idea that non-party states are
being inappropriately ‘bound’ is a clever rhetorical device, but as legal reasoning it is
completely untenable. This argument conflated the potential individual criminal responsibility of a US national with a legal obligation of the United States under the Rome Statute. Like
any treaty, the Statute creates obligations for states parties: these include the obligations to
comply with requests for the surrender and transfer of suspects to the Court,41 to provide
requested evidence,42 to give effect to fines or forfeitures ordered by the Court,43 and to pay
assessments for the regular budget of the Court.44 None of these obligations applies to any
non-party state, nor does the exercise of criminal jurisdiction against an individual accused
formally bind or condemn the state of his nationality.
Recent codification efforts have been careful to distinguish state responsibility from individual criminal responsibility. The Rome Statute of the ICC clarifies that ‘[n]o provision in
this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of
States under international law’,45 while the ILC Articles on State Responsibility affirm that
‘[t]hese articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under
international law of any person acting on behalf of a State’.46
Despite the clear legal distinction between individual criminal responsibility, on the one
hand, and state obligations and state responsibility, on the other, in some situations both types
of responsibility/accountability may indeed be involved.47 In one example of this ‘duality of
responsibility’48 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concurred with the judgment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that the 1995 massacre of
Muslim men by Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica was genocide,49 in the course of ruling that the
Serbian state had breached international law by failing to prevent and punish that genocide.50
The court’s decision acknowledged a link between state responsibility and individual responsibility when it affirmed that ‘a State can be held responsible for breaching the obligation to
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ICC Statute, art. 89(1).
Ibid. art. 93.
Ibid. art. 109(1).
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ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 1, art. 58.
As the International Law Commission has observed: ‘Where crimes against international law
are committed by State officials, it will often be the case that the State itself is responsible for the acts
in question or for failure to prevent or punish them. In certain cases, in particular aggression, the State
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ILC Commentary, note 2 supra, Commentary on Article 58, para. 3.
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‘The Court observes that that duality of responsibility continues to be a constant feature of
international law.’ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), ICJ, Judgment of 26 February 2007,
65, para. 173 (hereinafter ‘Genocide Case’), available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
49
‘The Court concludes that the acts committed at Srebrenica falling within Article II(a) and (b)
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of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; and accordingly that these were acts of genocide, committed by
members of the VRS in and around Srebrenica from about 13 July 1995.’ Ibid. 108, para. 297.
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prevent genocide only if genocide was actually committed’.51 A similar logic will no doubt
apply if and when the ICC decides to apply its recently agreed definition of aggression. Thus,
an individual will be subject to prosecution for the international crime of aggression only if
the state linked to him bears responsibility for prohibited acts of aggression.52 Any government would be likely to resist the prosecution of its national leader or leaders for a crime
implicating the responsibility of the state itself.

CONCLUSIONS
International criminal law is a relatively young area of law that has developed rapidly since
the ICTY was created in 1994. Looking ahead, it is likely that the law, practice and institutions of international criminal law will continue to develop well into the future. No particular result, however, is inevitable. It is possible that the ICC will evolve into a stronger, more
independent and effective institution of international justice; less beholden to states, and to
the UN Security Council, than international criminal tribunals have proved to be so far. It is
also possible that the ICC will fail to survive as a viable and credible institution.
The dynamic development and continuing uncertainty that together characterize the
present state of international criminal law present both challenges and opportunities for individuals, NGOs and states. The opportunity lies in the chance to participate in shaping a key
aspect of the future international order and hopefully in making it better. The challenge is to
do so in a principled way consistent not only with the requirements of criminal justice, but
also with agreed limits on international authority.
Advancing the Rule of Law Within the Agreed Limits of International Authority
So long as notorious impunity for international crimes endures, considerations of justice will
argue for greater and stronger international institutions to remedy the situation. Although it is
essential, moral theory alone cannot be the basis of effective and authoritative international
institutions of justice. A certain degree of international consensus is necessary as well. The
ICC Statute has been accepted by more than 114 countries, and thus its legitimacy extends to
over half the states in the international community. But what of the many states not accepting the ICC Statute, a group including the United States, China, India and Russia? These
countries represent most of the world’s population, possess most of its military force and hold
three vetoes within the UN Security Council as presently constituted. Their reluctance to
endorse the ICC is significant and cannot be ignored. The ICC was established based on a
broad but limited consensus of states. It must now operate within the jurisdictional constraints
that result from these limits.
The ICC Statute establishes an institution with extremely restricted jurisdiction, limited
only to specified criminal acts committed on the territory of, or by a national of, a state party
and in situations where there is no state willing or able genuinely to prosecute the case.53 In
51
52
53

Ibid. 154, para. 431.
See Faiza Patel King, Chapter 6
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many situations, such as that involving the atrocities in Darfur, this will not be enough jurisdiction to permit effective action.54 The UN Security Council ultimately referred the situation
in Darfur to the ICC, thereby granting it extraordinary jurisdiction based on the Council’s
authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.55 The experience of the ad hoc tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has already shown that international criminal courts can
function with the full support and authority of the UN Security Council. It remains to be seen
how effectively the ICC can operate in situations where that support is not forthcoming.
Institutions and officials involved in international criminal law should strive to advance
the rule of law and to be effective, but without exceeding the agreed limits of their authority.
Judge Georges Abi-Saab, writing in a separate opinion of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
1995, briefly opined that the international judges of the ICTY ‘are … afforded a unique
opportunity to assume the responsibility for the further rationalisation’ of the various categories of international crimes ‘from the perspective of the evolving international legal
order’.56 His point is that, at times, international judges should use their authority to build,
develop and reorganize international law. Our international legal order provides few opportunities for such a reasoned assessment because it is decentralized and chaotic in that there is
no international legislature, no international executive, and the existing international courts
have little effective jurisdiction.
But while international judges may rightly promote more effective international institutions, it is important for international judges, prosecutors and other officials to act within the
agreed limits of their authority. This is another aspect of the principle of legality discussed
above. Respect for this principle does not preclude judges from occasionally advancing the
development of international law through ‘teleological interpretation’ of treaties in the light
of their object and purpose. Inevitably, however, there must be limits on the discretion of
judges, especially when used to extend their own authority. In fact, recent developments
regarding the ICC Statute demonstrate that teleological interpretation may sometimes require
a more restrictive, rather than a more expansive, interpretation of a treaty text. The ICC’s
radical redefinition of its own complementary jurisdiction is a case in point.
The text of the Rome Statute of the ICC was agreed only after extended negotiations
involving a careful balance between the jurisdiction of the ICC and the national criminal
jurisdiction of states. If the practice of the ICC does not scrupulously respect this balance, the
ability to reach compromise in future international negotiations will be undermined. There is
ample reason for concern in this regard.
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In the case of Darfur, the same state, Sudan, is both the territorial state where the alleged
crimes were committed, and the state of nationality of those accused. Sudan is not a party to the ICC
Statute, therefore under the ICC Statute, the only possible basis for ICC jurisdiction over crimes in
Darfur is a referral by the UN Security Council.
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Perhaps the most fundamental compromise leading to agreement on the ICC Statute
concerned the relationship between the criminal jurisdiction of states and the so-called
‘complementary’ jurisdiction of the ICC. During the Rome negotiations, complementary
jurisdiction was understood to mean that the Court can exercise its jurisdiction over a case
only if the case is not being and has not been genuinely investigated or prosecuted by any
state.57 But thus far, the jurisprudence of the ICC suggests that its judges are taking an
approach to complementary jurisdiction which could deprive states of any real possibility of
challenging ICC jurisdiction by exercising their own criminal jurisdiction. The Court has
ruled that the complementarity assessment is case, and not situation, specific. In practice this
means that even if national courts genuinely and effectively pursue a full range of cases
within the context of a specific ‘situation’, to preclude ICC jurisdiction, those national
proceedings must be found by the ICC to concern the same ‘conduct’, the same ‘person’ and
perhaps even the same ‘incident’. Since it is difficult for any state to anticipate exactly which
cases the ICC Prosecutor will ultimately choose to bring regarding a given overall situation,
states may find it difficult, or even impossible, to exclude ICC jurisdiction by exercising their
national criminal jurisdiction under the principle of complementarity.58
Sarah Nouwen argues persuasively, based on the text of the ICC Statute, that popular
notions of complementarity are simplistic and misleading.59 Her technical argument is quite
sound, as is that of the ICC judges who have so far fleshed out the application of ICC admissibility/complementarity in practice. From a broader perspective, however, the degree of legal
hair-splitting involved in that argument seems to betray the true intent of the parties at the
Rome ICC Conference.60 International criminal courts, like national courts, should exercise
judicial restraint where appropriate. An appropriate time to do so may be now, with regard to
the sensitive issue of balancing national and international criminal jurisdiction. ‘Popular
notions of complementarity’ may appear simplistic in light of the actual text of the ICC
Statute, but it was on the basis of just these popular notions that states were persuaded to
adopt the Statute in Rome and then subsequently to ratify it. The arguments that effectively
carried the day in bringing the ICC into existence cannot be irrelevant to the interpretation
and application of the ICC Statute.
The relevant object and purpose of the ICC Statute, for purposes of its teleological interpretation, should include not only advancing international justice, but also ensuring effective
ICC deference to the national jurisdiction of those states genuinely willing and able to prosecute serious international crimes. In general, these goals are not incompatible. Prioritizing
the former over the latter, even when there is no evidence of a clear conflict between them,
could have unintended negative consequences, not only for international justice, but for international law and institutions in general.
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International Justice Depends Primarily upon the National Jurisdiction of States
The pioneering work of international criminal tribunals has kick-started the cause of international justice, but it has also exposed the limits of these same institutions. International trials
are slow, expensive and ultimately they depend upon the cooperation of states. National
courts must be a big part of any general strategy for the enforcement of international criminal law, and a proper balance must be found between national and international criminal jurisdiction.
The establishment and functioning of international criminal courts and tribunals is
certainly an important historic accomplishment, but this success should not blind us to the
fact that these international institutions have only limited economic and political resources
which should be used wisely. International prosecutors, in particular, need to be strategic in
focusing upon the most important cases.
In most cases the only way to enforce international criminal law is through the use of
national courts. International criminal courts are needed to complement this mechanism, not
to replace it. The essays in this volume highlight the astonishing pace of development of
international criminal law over the past two decades, as well as the many contentious issues
yet to be resolved. Answers to all these questions will not come overnight. One can only hope
that the best way forward will eventually emerge from the practice of states and that of the
evolving institutions of international criminal law.

